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The Priority of Law: A Response to 
Michael Stokes Paulsen 
Eugene Volokh* 
Professor Paulsen’s Priority of God1 is an interesting and provocative 
contribution.  Let me offer, though, a few critical thoughts. 
First, an observation, which perhaps Professor Paulsen might not 
disagree with, but which other friends of religious freedom might find 
troubling: Under the Priority of God theory of religious freedom, a mostly 
irreligious country—like some European countries today, and like America 
might perhaps one day be—shouldn’t provide such freedom.2 
After all, the Priority of God view is that “religious liberty provisions 
make no sense except on the supposition that God exists—that such a thing 
as religious truth exists and that the commands of true religious faith are real 
and superior to the commands of civil society.”3  If most citizens doubt that 
God commands us to do anything, then they can’t well act based on the 
supposed priority of God’s commands.  Under Professor Paulsen’s view, 
religious liberty makes no sense in a mostly irreligious country.4 
Second, Priority of God argues for a legal system that would require the 
government to judge quintessentially theological questions.  The article 
proposes a strikingly broad vision of religious exemptions, but naturally it 
can’t endorse exemptions from all laws, including murder laws and the like.  
So it cabins this vision by asserting that “surely there are some claims 
individuals make about God’s commands that are simply intolerably and 
irredeemably false.”5  Courts applying the Free Exercise Clause would 
therefore grant exemptions only for a practice that “has any plausible claim 
 *  Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law (volokh@law.ucla.edu).  This 
paper is a response to Michael Stokes Paulsen’s The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 
39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159 (2013), and a part of Pepperdine University School of Law’s February 2012 
conference entitled, The Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? 
 1.  Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1159 (2013). 
 2.  See id. at 1185–87. 
 3.  See id. at 1161. 
 4.  Id. at 1185–88. 
 5.  Id. at 1161. 
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to religious truth—that is, as long as the claimed religious right is not 
contrary to the clear, universal moral command of God, resulting in serious 
harms outside the truly consenting, sincerely confessing community of 
faith.”6 
Would it really advance religious freedom in a multidenominational 
society for courts to decide which practices have “plausible claim[s] to 
religious truth,” and what the “clear, universal moral command of God” 
might be?  I don’t think so.  The Court has rightly refused to get into the 
business of judging religious truth,7 or interpreting religious doctrine.8  Both 
religious believers and the Justices, I think, are better off that way. 
Confirmation hearings are bad enough as they are.  Do we want them to 
also turn into forums to discuss what the nominee thinks is the scope of the 
“clear, universal moral command of God”?9  Likewise, Religion Clauses 
cases even today yield a good deal of religious discord among Americans.  
Do we want to add to that the discord that would likely happen when there’s 
a 5-4 opinion about what constitutes the “clear, universal moral command of 
God”?  My guess is no. 
Finally, how could a nonreligious judge make decisions under such a 
system?  How can someone who doesn’t believe in God figure out what the 
“clear, universal moral command of God” would be, if there were a God?   
To be sure, judges sometimes have to deal with counterfactuals, and 
operate based on hypothetical assumptions.  But nonreligious people are 
likely to find it very hard to operate based on a hypothetical that is so foreign 
to their worldview.  And even religious people who lack much training or 
inclination for comparative theology might have a hard time reasoning about 
the “clear, universal moral command of God” that goes beyond their own 
understanding of God. 
Third, it seems to me that Priority of God doesn’t sufficiently address 
the key question of religious exemption law: Why should my belief in what 
God commands me to do allow me to take something away from you, when 
you don’t share this belief? 
Say that I believe I should trespass on your property (for instance, to 
worship at a visitation of the Virgin Mary that I think happened on your 
property).  Say that I believe I should breach my contract, for instance 
because I’ve had a religious experience that tells me that I should no longer 
do what I promised to do.  Say that I believe I should make loud calls to 
prayer in the early morning, though that might constitute a nuisance.  Say 
 6.  Id. at 1162. 
 7.  See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87–88 (1871). 
 8.  See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440 (1969); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). 
 9.  Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1162. 
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that I believe I should spread the word of God to everyone by distributing 
millions of copies of the holy books, but those books happen to be works to 
which you own the copyright. 
These cases do not involve “very serious threats or injury to life, liberty, 
or even property of another” (the test Priority of God seems to urge), at least 
if “very serious” is to have much meaning.10  But all involve my claiming a 
constitutional right to do something that violates what the legal system views 
as your rights—and my claimed right is based on nothing more than my 
assertion that God told me to do this, even though your view of God is 
entirely different.  I don’t think our legal system ought to endorse such a 
constitutional right. 
Fourth, Priority of God seems to take the view that the Constitution 
enshrines a particular set of private rights, which we might enjoy without 
having others infringe them for religious reasons, but that the legal system 
may not recognize any new private rights that would have the same force.11  
Religious exemptions, the article says, should be denied when they harm 
others—but the courts shouldn’t count “purported harms to third parties that 
are either relatively minor or that involve injuries to new, non-common law, 
non-natural ‘rights’ (for example, statutory rights creating affirmative 
benefits or broad freedom from others’ actions extending beyond traditional 
baseline conceptions of private rights).”12 
But does the Constitution really constitutionalize a “natural rights” 
theory of private rights, or for that matter constitutionalize the common law, 
where religious claims are involved?  Nondiscrimination rights, employee 
rights, environmental law rights, copyright (outside the narrow scope of 
common-law copyright), and more might not be “common law” rights or 
“traditional” rights.  Yet rightly or wrongly our society has embraced them, 
perhaps because its views of right and wrong are not the same as those of the 
judges who made the common law in centuries past. 
I can imagine an originalist argument that suggests that the Free 
Exercise Clause was indeed understood as constitutionalizing a common-law 
baseline in such matters.  But Priority of God does not make such an 
argument, and I doubt such an argument would be historically accurate.  
And if one isn’t speaking of originalist evidence and is instead making a 
normative claim about what would constitute a wise Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence, I see little basis for constitutionally enshrining the set of value 
 10.  Id. at 1208. 
 11.  Id. at 1208–09. 
 12.  Id. 
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judgments embodied in traditional common law above the set of value 
judgments embodied in modern statutes. 
Indeed, as I argued in an earlier article, A Common-Law Model for 
Religious Exemptions,13 a constitutional religious exemption regime of the 
Sherbert/Yoder variety would make much the same mistake as what is often 
called the Lochner regime did in its day—though likely even to a greater 
degree.14  Lochner v. New York15 constitutionalized some liberty claims 
(limited by traditional, common-law restraints), subject to a sort of moderate 
intermediate scrutiny.16  Priority of God would constitutionalize a vast range 
of liberty claims (limited by traditional, common-law restraints), subject to a 
standard beyond strict scrutiny. 
To be sure, the liberty claims constitutionalized under the Priority of 
God model would be limited to claims based on religious belief.  But the 
article’s scheme would provide an incentive for broad claims of religious 
belief, both insincere and sincere.17  Many people, after all, have 
comprehensive religious visions that affect many aspects of their lives, and 
may conflict with a vast range of laws (especially once one considers that 
people might make religious claims based not just on scriptural laws but also 
on felt individual commands from God18). 
As I argued in A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, all the 
debates that the Court has largely avoided through its narrowing of 
substantive due process law would come back in front of the courts.19  
Washington v. Glucksberg,20 for instance, left questions about assisted 
suicide to the political branches, partly because such questions involve moral 
and practical questions that, the Court reasoned, should not be for unelected 
Supreme Court Justices to decide.21  But under the Priority of God model, 
anyone who has a religious objection to assisted suicide law (perhaps 
because he interprets the parable of the Good Samaritan as requiring him to 
offer help to others who are in agony) would have a solid religious 
 13.  Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465 
(1999). 
 14.  See id. at 1495–99. 
 15.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 16.  See id. at 60. 
 17.  See Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1182–89, 1213–16. 
 18.  See, e.g., Marvin v. Giles, 463 N.E.2d 81 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (involving a religious 
exemption claim—brought in the context of an unemployment compensation scheme—based on a 
claimant’s assertion that he “had a religious experience and was told by God to return to his home in 
Alabama within two years to help raise his deceased sister’s six children”). 
 19.  See Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, supra note 13, at 1529–36. 
 20.  521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 21.  Id. at 702–04, 735; see also Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 
supra note 13, at 1528–29. 
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exemption claim, to be judged under strict scrutiny or perhaps super-strict 
scrutiny.22 
The same would go for any businessperson who has religious objections 
to antidiscrimination laws,23 to minimum wage laws,24 or a wide range of 
other laws.  Anyone who feels a religious objection to testifying against a 
family member,25 or against a coreligionist,26 would presumptively get an 
exemption.  Each legal obligation would survive only if courts conclude that 
the moral judgments behind the law are compelling enough, and the 
practical superiority of the law to other alternatives is clear enough.  That is 
Lochner plus. 
What, then, is the alternative?  I wouldn’t give up so quickly on the 
“modern” model that Priority of God rejects.27   
Under that model, religious exemptions are valuable to society because 
they are valuable to many members of society.28  Some generally applicable 
laws impose very modest burdens on others, but impose a grave burden on 
religious groups, a burden that the lawmakers often didn’t anticipate; 
consider, for instance, no-headgear rules in various forms of government 
 22.  See Paulsen, supra note 1, at Parts III–IV. 
 23.  See Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, supra note 13, at 1499. 
 24.  See id. at 1524. 
 25.  See Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions—A Research Agenda 
with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 604 n.20 (1999); compare In re Grand Jury Empaneling 
of the Special Grand Jury, 171 F.3d 826 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that RFRA does not allow a 
religiously motivated refusal to testify against a family member, at least in this case), and In re Doe, 
842 F.2d 244, 245–48 (10th Cir. 1988) (same, under Free Exercise Clause), with In re Greenberg, 11 
Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 579 (D. Conn. 1982) (holding the opposite, under Free Exercise Clause), and In 
re Grand Jury Empaneling, 171 F.3d at 837 (McKee, J., dissenting) (same, under RFRA).  Cf. 
Grossberg’s Parents Ask to Keep Talks Confidential, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 26, 1997, at 43: 
The parents of Amy Grossberg, the college student accused of killing her newborn in 
Delaware . . . argued in court papers that talks with their daughter should be kept secret 
and that it is a violation of their right to the free exercise of religion [for prosecutors] to 
force them to divulge information.  Rabbi Joel Roth, a legal expert at the Jewish 
Theological Seminary in New York City, confirmed yesterday he wrote an affidavit for 
the Grossbergs, stating that “under Jewish law, a mother and/or a father are not allowed 
to give testimony against their child in any legal proceeding.” 
Id. 
 26.  See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Rabbi Jailed for Refusing to Testify Against Co-Religionists, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 19, 2012, 10:48 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/03/19/rabbi-jailed-for-
refusing-to-testify-against-co-religionists/; Benjamin Weiser, Theological Discussion on Testifying 
Emerges in Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1999, at 33 (discussing a witness who refused to 
testify on the grounds that in his view the Koran taught Muslims to do nothing that “will cause harm 
to innocents,” and that testifying in this case would be seen by his community as “a major sin” and 
“a betrayal of our beliefs as Muslims”). 
 27.  See Paulsen, supra note 1, at Part II.C. 
 28.  See id. at 1171. 
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employment, or motorcycle helmet laws that make it impossible for 
observant Sikhs to lawfully ride a motorcycle.29  It therefore makes sense to 
implement some religious exemptions, in cases where they benefit the 
religious observers without much harming others. 
Who then is to decide which exemptions really can be granted without 
much harming others?  Legislatures sometimes can, by carving out statute-
by-statute exemptions.  But often legislatures won’t think about it in 
advance, and it can be hard for religious minorities to get a place on the 
legislative agenda when the problem arises.30 
So it makes sense to have courts decide, in the first instance, whether an 
exemption would really unduly interfere with other people’s rights and 
interests (whether directly or indirectly, for instance by costing taxpayers too 
much).  That, after all, is what courts have long done when developing 
common-law rules and the exceptions to those rules, and indeed legislatures 
have sometimes delegated courts this authority in carving out exceptions 
even to statutory rules.31  Consider, for instance, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, which delegate to courts the development of evidentiary 
privileges, or the Copyright Act of 1976, which delegates to courts the 
continued development of fair use law.32 
But, as with common-law rules and the statutory delegations, the 
legislatures should have the power to conclude that, for moral or practical 
reasons, some exemptions should be denied.  And this power to reject court-
made religious exemptions is what avoids the Lochner problem. 
As it happens, I think this is pretty much the legal framework that we 
have after Employment Division v. Smith33 in those jurisdictions that have 
adopted RFRAs.  There are no constitutionally mandated exemptions 
(outside narrow zones, such as the power of religious institutions to select 
their clergy).  But there are statute-by-statute exemptions, for example the 
conscientious objector exemption from draft law and the clergy-penitent 
privilege as an exemption from the duty to testify.34 
What is more, the RFRAs provide what I call a common-law exemption 
model, in which courts can recognize exemptions but subject to trumping by 
legislatures.  Say, for instance, that a court applying a state RFRA concludes 
 29.  See Volokh, A Common-Law Model, supra note 13, at 1477–78; see also Buhl v. Hannigan, 
20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740, 747–48 (Ct. App. 1993) (analyzing whether the mandatory motorcycle helmet 
law infringed upon a Sikh’s freedom of religion); State v. Miller, 538 N.W.2d 573, 579 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1995) (creating a religious exemption for bright signs on slow moving vehicles). 
 30.  Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, supra note 13, at 1533–35. 
 31.  See id. at 1476–80. 
 32.  FED. R. EVID. 501; Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see also Volokh, A 
Common Law Model for Religious Exemptions, supra note 13, at 1476. 
 33.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 34.  See Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, supra note 13, at 1478–49. 
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that there ought to be a religious exemption from housing discrimination law 
for landlords who have a religious objection to lending to unmarried couples 
(or just to same-sex couples).35  Then, if the legislature takes a different view 
of the importance of equal treatment in housing, the elected representatives 
of the people can have the final word. 
Even religious people, I think, should be reluctant to have the “priority 
of God” enshrined as the basis of a principle to be applied by secular courts.  
Such a principle would require those courts to make judgments about what 
God might want and about what God cannot possibly want.  And it would 
mean that, as a constitutional matter, my view of what God demands can 
undermine your rights, even though your view of God is very different from 
mine.  Priority of law—with both statute-by-statute exemptions and RFRA 
exemptions providing a democratically supported basis for accommodating 
many (though not all) religious objections—is a better approach. 
 
 35.  See id. at 1475–76, 1556–58 & n.191; see also State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9–11 (Minn. 
1990) (accepting such a claim under the Minnesota Constitution, using the same strict scrutiny 
analysis that is mandated by state RFRAs). 
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